Private consumption and investment continue to drive growth
In 2026, Spanish growth will continue to moderate while remaining solid and significantly higher than that of the major European economies. The economy will once again be driven by robust private domestic demand. Household consumption (representing nearly 55% of GDP) is supported by increased purchasing power thanks to moderate inflation, a dynamic labour market and, consequently, an increase in real gross disposable income. Wage increases negotiated in collective agreements averaged 3.5% in 2025, once again outpacing inflation. The unemployment rate fell below 10% in Q4 2025 for the first time since the financial crisis. In addition, the strong job market is accompanied by an increase in the working population on back of the arrival of immigrants. Since 2022, the foreign population has contributed more than 70% to the increase in the working population. In the third quarter of 2025, the household savings rate stood at 12% of disposable income, a historically high level (2015-2019 average of 7.3%) despite its gradual decline over the past year, after reaching 13.1% in Q3 2024.
On top of this, net foreign trade is expected to once again contribute negatively to growth due to slowing exports combined with strong imports to meet domestic demand. While Spain once again recorded a record year for tourism in 2025 thanks to foreign visitors (97 million arrivals, up 3% year-on-year, after +10% in 2024), normalisation of the sector's recovery will bring about a more limited contribution. Exports of services will nevertheless continue to benefit from the strength of tourism, which will remain a fundamental pillar of the country's growth (representing 16% of its GDP and 14% of total employment in 2024). In addition, goods exports will be exposed to the appreciation of the euro against the US dollar and fragile demand from neighbouring countries, since nearly 65% (mainly consisting of cars, machinery, refined oil, pharmaceuticals, plastics and food) is destined for the rest of the European Union (71% including the UK). However, Spain is less exposed to US tariffs than other European countries, with the US accounting for less than 5% of its goods exports.
The recovery in private investment (representing just over 20% of GDP) should continue thanks to the gradually improving financial conditions. However, it could be hampered by companies' risk aversion, particularly in view of persistent uncertainty clouding the international economic and geopolitical landscape. Investment will also be supported by the acceleration of European fund disbursements under the National Recovery Plan, with nearly EUR 80 billion in grants and EUR 83 billion in loans for the period 2021-2026. At the beginning of 2026, Spain had received barely 44% of the total amount. With funding requests due to expire in August 2026, disbursements could therefore accelerate in the first half of the year. However, in December 2025, the government announced that it intended to waive nearly EUR 60 billion in loans, arguing that its improved credit profile allowed it to borrow directly on the market at similar or even more advantageous rates, allowing it to sidestep the conditions and implementation deadlines attached to European funds. It will therefore simply release the remaining EUR 25 billion in grants, which will reduce the total fund package to 8% of 2019 GDP. A modest contribution from public spending is also expected in the absence of a new budget.
Gradual consolidation of public finances
The consolidation of public finances should be confirmed despite the fact that it unlikely that the 2026 Budget will be passed, which will result in the renewal of the 2023 Budget for a third consecutive year. However, the public accounts will remain in deficit after having deteriorated significantly during the health and energy crises. The narrowing of the deficit will be supported by the easing of aid for flooding linked to DANA (October 2024) and the positive impact of strong consumption and labour market dynamics on revenues. Spain is thus expected to post a primary surplus in 2026 (i.e. excluding debt interest) for the first time since 2007. However, while the government has withdrawn most of the support measures adopted during the energy crisis, it has extended the social electricity voucher, which reduces electricity bills for the most vulnerable consumers until the end of 2026. Although Spain manage to avoid the excessive deficit procedure in 2024 despite the reinstatement of European fiscal rules, the sustainability of its heavy public debt remains one of the country's medium-term challenges. While the renewed budget contains public spending increases, the lack of structural reforms is slowing down fiscal consolidation and debt relief. Despite the downward trend in recent years, Spain’s net external public debt remains among the highest in the European Union (44.2% of GDP in Q3 2025).
The current account surplus recorded since 2013 has quickly recovered from the health and energy crises and is expected to stabilise in 2026. This marked improvement is mainly due to the significant surplus in the services balance (more than 6.3% of GDP in 2024), which has rebounded thanks to foreign tourism. The surplus compensates for the structural deficit in the goods balance, largely attributable to energy dependence (although the bill has fallen since 2022), and in the income balance (remittances from Latin American and Moroccan diasporas to their countries of origin).
Divided coalition blocks the rollout of major reforms and jeopardises governmental stability
Following the snap general elections in July 2023 and in the absence of a viable alternative on the right, outgoing Socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez (PSOE) managed to remain in power despite coming second. Despite the absence of an absolute majority (121 seats out of 350), the left-wing party was still in a better position to form a government than the Popular Party (right-wing) led by his rival Alberto Núñez Feijóo. Sánchez was therefore once again forced to form a coalition with 179 votes, including those of his main left-wing ally Sumar (31), EH Bildu (6), ERC (7), Junts (7), PNV (5), BNG (1) and the Canarian Coalition (1).
The patchy coalition, which includes Catalan and Basque separatist parties, immediately underscored the government’s fragility and thwarted the leadership despite prior negotiations and controversial concessions. The passing of the Amnesty Act pardoning Catalan separatists involved in the 2017 independence attempt does not, however, apply to Junts leader Carles Puigdemont, who is still in exile in Belgium. This fragility was made clear when the Catalan separatist party Junts announced in October 2025 that it was breaking ties with the PSOE, thus placing Sánchez's government in a minority position and forcing political paralysis, as demonstrated by the rejection of the 2026 Budget. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s failure to obtain support for the budget for the third consecutive year once again calls into question his ability to govern due to the dependence on regional independence parties. The government is unable to pass wide-sweeping reforms and is forced to govern by decree, negotiating on a case-by-case basis. However, Junts seems to have ruled out the idea of supporting a motion of no confidence with the PP and Vox, thus avoiding another snap election for the time being. The regional elections taking place in the first half of 2026 could spell a change in voting trends ahead of the general elections scheduled for the summer of 2027.

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